THE BOTTOM LINE:
FEDERAL LAWMAKERS SHOULD REIN IN COSTLY RULES TO RESTORE LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY.
America was founded on the principles of limited government, dividing power among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. But over time, Congress has unlawfully delegated its lawmaking power to administrative agencies, allowing for an unaccountable “fourth branch” to develop.1 Today, unelected bureaucrats promulgate rules that carry the force and effect of law through notice-and- comment rulemaking and effectively make law by issuing “guidance” documents not subject to the same notice requirements.2 Unsurprisingly, the volume of federal regulations has only ballooned over time, with the number of regulations consistently growing over the decades.3
But the growing number of regulations is only part of the problem. In addition to the costs to personal freedom, many regulations come with huge price tags, costing federal taxpayers billions of dollars every year.4 This is especially troubling during a time of high gas prices and skyrocketing inflation.5 Making matters even worse, President Biden is on a regulatory spending spree, adding more than $200 billion in new regulatory costs during his first year alone.6 With no end in sight to Biden’s runaway regulatory spree, Congress needs to act now to reclaim its lawmaking power and rein in out-of-control regulations.
The volume and cost of regulations have reached record highs
The size of the regulatory state has reached record highs. The Code of Federal Regulations, which codifies all current federal regulations, already spans more than 105 million words across nearly 190,000 pages.7-8 Those pages include more than 1.3 million regulatory mandates and restrictions.9-10 Nearly half of those mandates and restrictions flow from just five federal agencies, with the Environmental Protection Agency leading the pack.11
The volume of regulations has soared by nearly 40 percent in the last two decades, with no sign of slowing down.12 In 2021, the Federal Register published nearly 75,000 pages of new proposed and final regulations, executive orders, presidential proclamations, and agency notices.13
The sheer volume of regulations alone is overwhelming, making it impossible for a person to know and follow every rule to which they are subject. But discordance between the rule of law and “rule by regulation” is only part of the problem. The cost to federal taxpayers to develop, administer, and enforce these regulations has more than tripled since 2000—reaching nearly $80 billion per year by 2021.14 Worse yet, these costs only account for a subset of federal agencies that primarily regulate the private sector, excluding several major agencies, such as the Internal Revenue Service, Social Security Administration, Department of Defense, and the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services.15
But the direct costs to create and enforce regulations tell only part of the story. Americans spend more than 10 billion hours on regulatory compliance paperwork alone, costing more than $140 billion every year.16 When accounting for compliance costs, economic losses, and other costs, federal regulations cost Americans an estimated $2 trillion each year.17-21
Unfortunately, these costs will only continue to soar higher, as President Biden has issued more costly regulations than any other president in modern American history.
President Biden has launched a record-shattering regulatory spending spree
The size of the regulatory state has exploded, and the Biden administration is accelerating that growth at breakneck speed. The Obama administration finalized more than 29,000 new regulations over the course of eight years—one new page of regulations added every 20 minutes of his presidency.22-23 In the average year during the Obama era, bureaucrats adopted new regulations with a price tag of more than $100 billion.24 But these regulatory records would be shattered by the Biden administration just a few years later.
When President Trump took office, he immediately froze all proposed and pending regulations until his administration could review them.25 The Trump administration then quickly withdrew or delayed more than 1,500 regulatory actions planned by Obama-era bureaucrats.26 Trump issued an executive order creating a federal regulatory budget to control both the number of regulations and cost of compliance with regulations.27 The order established a “one-in, two-out” policy, which required agencies to eliminate at least two old regulations for every new regulation, while also requiring agencies to offset any new regulatory costs with savings from deregulatory actions, effectively setting a cap on new costs.28-29
Trump also issued executive orders prohibiting federal agencies from issuing binding rules through regulatory and sub-regulatory guidance and requiring agencies to provide more transparency for regulations and guidance by making current guidance readily available to the public on searchable databases.30-31 Over the course of the next four years, the Trump administration would finalizemore than 500 deregulatory actions, lowering regulatory costs by nearly $200 billion.32
But these deregulatory successes were immediately wiped out by President Biden’s record- shattering regulatory spending spree. On his very first day in office, Biden issued an executive order undoing the Trump administration’s work to establish regulatory budgets for federal agencies, along with several other regulatory reform initiatives.33
President Biden is issuing more costly regulations than any other president in modern American history. The Federal Register published more than 72,000 pages of new regulations, executive orders, and agency notices in President Biden’s first year—a record high.34 Those new regulations were also far more likely to carry a hefty price tag. In 2021, the Biden administration finalized 69 economically significant regulations—regulations that carry a $100 million annual price tag or have a substantial effect on the economy—more than triple the number finalized in President Trump’s first year.35
In his first year, President Biden finalized regulations adding more than $200 billion in new regulatory costs—more than quadruple the costs added during President Obama’s first year.36 Cumulative regulatory costs have continued to climb since 2009, ballooning to $1.1 trillion under the Biden administration.37
Worse yet, there is no end in sight. More than one in three regulations reviewed by Biden’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs has been economically significant—more than double the rate of the last four administrations.38-39
President Biden’s hyperregulation is leading to higher inflation
In 2021, inflation hit a 40-year high, with goods and services growing 7.1 percent over the year.40 The inflation crisis has grown even worse in 2022, reaching 9.1 percent by June.41 The Biden administration initially denied that there was even a risk of inflation, then, once it became apparent prices were rapidly rising, pivoted to promises that it would be “temporary” or “transitory.”42 Since then, the Biden administration has blamed Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, oil companies, “corporate greed,” and small businesses owners running local gas stations.43-46
Many factors are contributing to the massive inflation crisis facing everyday Americans. Expanded welfare benefits and the elimination of commonsense work requirements have exacerbated labor shortages that are driving up costs for businesses.47 The massive increase in government spending, with President Biden’s $1.9 trillion American Rescue Plan Act serving as a capstone, has played a major role.48 Issuing moratoriums on oil and natural gas leases, revoking permits for drilling and pipelines, promoting schemes to choke off access to capital for domestic energy companies, and other tactics in President Biden’s war on energy have also added fuel to the inflation fire.49-53
But one area that gets virtually no attention is the impact of the Biden administration’s regulatory spending spree.54
When Washington, D.C. wraps the economy in red tape, businesses must spend massive sums on compliance. Every dollar that goes toward hiring lawyers, filling out paperwork, and redesigning products and assembly lines gets passed to consumers through higher prices. In fact, increasing federal regulations by 15 percent leads to cost hikes of consumer goods and services by a full percentage point.55 The Biden administration’s regulation obsession will only drive prices and inflation higher.
Congress must rein in out-of-control regulations
Unable to secure his major policy changes through Congress after Democrats lost control of the House and then the Senate, President Obama famously quipped that he did not need to wait for legislation, because he had “a pen and a phone.”56 He elaborated that he would use that pen to “take executive actions where Congress won’t.”57 President Biden appears to be following the same path, despite Democrats having control over both chambers of Congress.
But this “pen and phone” strategy only works because Congress has delegated far too much legislative authority to unchecked and unaccountable bureaucrats in federal agencies. Thankfully, Congress can rein in these out-of-control regulations by reasserting its legislative authority over major policy decisions. Recent Supreme Court decisions have affirmed that such major policy decisions rest with Congress itself, and bureaucrats cannot abuse vague, decades-old statutes to impose present-day regulations on the American people.58
Congress could begin reining in costly regulations by requiring all major rules—such as those with a price tag larger than $100 million per year—to receive congressional and presidential approval to take effect.59-63 Congress must rein in Biden’s out-of-control regulatory spending spree before it gets worse. Fortunately, federal lawmakers can build on lessons learned by states and restore legislative oversight and accountability over costly rules.
Congress can learn from states’ regulatory reforms
Federal policymaking is often built on a foundation of lessons learned from states, and regulatory reform is no different. Florida, West Virginia, and Wisconsin are just some of the states that require legislative approval for major regulatory actions.64-66
In West Virginia, an agency is “deemed to be applying to the Legislature for permission” when proposing a rule in order to promulgate the rule.67-69 Accordingly, virtually all rules must be approved by the legislature before going into effect. Proposed rules are submitted for initial review to the Legislative Rule-Making Review Committee, which then makes recommendations to the full legislature to authorize the proposed regulations in full or in part, amend, withdraw, or reject.70-71 If the legislature does not approve the regulation, it does not go into effect.72
In Florida, rules that have an adverse economic impact or regulatory costs exceeding $1 million over five years can only take effect if they are ratified by the legislature through a bill.73-74 As a result, proposals for costly rules are subject to the political process entailed by Florida’s legislative session. By only requiring legislative approval of rules that adversely affect the economy or increase regulatory costs, Florida has created a deregulatory ratchet of sorts. Governors can work to reduce burdensome regulations without legislative approval, but agencies creating new costly regulations must work with the legislature.
Over the years, Florida lawmakers have continued to build on the state’s proven track record of deregulation. During then-Governor Rick Scott’s first six years in office, his administration repealed nearly 5,000 regulations, reducing red tape for Floridians.75
Just as Florida utilizes an economic threshold in its model, in Wisconsin, rules with $10 million in compliance costs over the course of two years can only take effect if lawmakers pass new legislation authorizing those regulations.76 The legislature’s Joint Committee for Review of Administrative Rules may also indefinitely object to a proposed regulation, blocking the rule until lawmakers pass new legislation authorizing it.77
Though state models are not always applicable at the federal level, Congress can build on the lessons learned from states’ regulatory reform efforts to restore oversight, accountability, and legislative authority over costly regulations.78 Florida, West Virginia, and Wisconsin are just a few states that have established a form of legislative approval for regulatory actions, with Arkansas, Colorado, Maine, and Utah having similar requirements.79-85
THE BOTTOM LINE: Federal lawmakers should rein in costly rules to restore legislative oversight and accountability.
Inflation is soaring, and Americans are struggling with the high cost of everyday items like groceries and gas. Even worse, President Biden is on an out-of-control regulatory spending spree with no end in sight. Just in his first year, Biden finalized regulations adding more than $200 billion in new regulatory costs.86 This is more than four times the costs added during Obama’s first year.87
Thankfully, Congress can rein in out-of-control regulations with a simple, commonsense solution. States have laid the groundwork by requiring legislative approval of major rules. Federal lawmakers should build on lessons learned by states and require approval of all major rules to restore accountability and oversight.
1. Congressional Research Service, “An overview of federal regulations and the rulemaking process,” Congressional Research Service (2021), https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/IF10003.pdf.
3. QuantGov, “Growth of federal regulatory restrictions over time, 1970 – 2019,” Mercatus Center (2022), https://www.quantgov.org/visualizations-of-rd-32.
4. See, e.g., Mark Febrizio and Melinda Warren, “Regulators’ budget: Overall spending and staffing remain stable – An analysis of the U.S. budget for fiscal years 1960 through 2021,” Weidenbaum Center on the Economy, Government, and Public Policy and the George Washington University Regulatory Studies Center (2020), https://regulatorystudies.columbian.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs4751/files/downloads/RegulatorsBudget/GW%20Re g%20Studies%20-%20FY2021%20Regulators%20Budget%20.%20MFebrizio%20and%20MWarren_Weidenbaum%20Center.pdf.
5. Scott Horsley, “No retreat in the summer heat. Inflation blistering at 9.1% in June,” National Public Radio (2022), https://www.npr.org/2022/07/13/1111070073/no-retreat-in-the-summer-heat-prices-likely-topped-40-year-high-last.month.
6. Jonathan Ingram, “It’s not just spending—Biden’s record regulations are driving inflation too,” New York Post (2022), https://nypost.com/2022/05/23/its-not-just-spending-bidens-record-regulations-are-driving-inflation-too.
7. In 2021, the Code of Federal Regulations contained 188,321 pages. See, e.g., Office of the Federal Register, “Federal Register and CFR publication statistics: Aggregated charts,” National Archives and Records Administration (2022), https://uploads.federalregister.gov/uploads/2022/06/17143841/FR-Stats-2021-combined.updated.pdf.
8. In 2021, the Code of Federal Regulations contained 105,263,314 words. See, e.g., QuantGov, “RegData United States 4.1: Annual restrictions,” Mercatus Center (2022), https://quantgov-bulk.downloads.s3.amazonaws.com/RegData-US_4-1.zip.
9. In 2021, the Code of Federal Regulations contained 1,325,826 regulatory restriction words. See, e.g., QuantGov, “RegData United States 4.1: Annual restrictions,” Mercatus Center (2022), https://quantgov-bulk.downloads.s3.amazonaws.com/RegData-US_4-1.zip.
10. The total number of mandates and restrictions is likely higher than reported, as this analysis only accounts for regulations containing the specific terms “shall,” “must,” “may not,” “prohibited,” and “required.”
11. Approximately 47.3 percent of regulatory restriction words in the Code of Federal Regulations come from the Environmental Protection Agency (15.9 percent), Department of Transportation (8.4 percent), Department of Agriculture (8.3 percent), Department of the Treasury (8.1 percent), and Department of Health and Human Services (6.6 percent). See, e.g., QuantGov, “RegData United States 4.1: Agency restrictions,” Mercatus Center (2022), https://quantgov-bulk-downloads.s3.amazonaws.com/RegData-US_4-1.zip.
12. Authors’ calculations based upon the number of words in the Code of Federal Regulations in 2000 and 2021. See, e.g., QuantGov, “RegData United States 4.1: Agency restrictions,” Mercatus Center (2022), https://quantgov-bulk.downloads.s3.amazonaws.com/RegData-US_4-1.zip.
13. Office of the Federal Register, “Federal Register and CFR publication statistics: Aggregated charts,” National Archives and Records Administration (2022), https://uploads.federalregister.gov/uploads/2022/06/17143841/FR.Stats-2021-combined-updated.pdf.
14. Mark Febrizio and Melinda Warren, “Regulators’ budget: Overall spending and staffing remain stable – An analysis of the U.S. budget for fiscal years 1960 through 2021,” Weidenbaum Center on the Economy, Government, and Public Policy and the George Washington University Regulatory Studies Center (2020), https://regulatorystudies.columbian.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs4751/files/downloads/RegulatorsBudget/GW%20Re g%20Studies%20-%20FY2021%20Regulators%20Budget%20.%20MFebrizio%20and%20MWarren_Weidenbaum%20Center.pdf.
16.Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, “Inventory of currently approved information collections: Government-wide totals for active information collections,” Office of Management and Budget (2022), https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/PRAReport?operation=11.
17. The National Association of Manufacturers estimated total federal regulatory costs at $2 trillion in 2012. See, e.g., W. Mark Crain and Nicole V. Crain, “The cost of federal regulation to the U.S. economy, manufacturing, and small business,” National Association of Manufacturers (2014), https://www.nam.org/wp.content/uploads/2019/05/Federal-Regulation-Full-Study.pdf.
18. The Small Business Administration estimated total federal regulatory costs at $1.75 trillion in 2008. See, e.g., Nicole V. Crain and W. Mark Crain, “The impact of regulatory costs on small firms,” Small Business Administration (2010), https://web.archive.org/web/20101202043257/http://www.sba.gov/advo/research/rs371tot.pdf.
19. The Competitive Enterprise institute estimated total federal regulatory costs at more than $1.9 trillion in 2020. See, e.g., Clyde Wayne Crews Jr., “Ten thousand commandments: An annual snapshot of the federal regulatory state,” Competitive Enterprise Institute (2021), https://cei.org/wp.content/uploads/2021/06/Ten_Thousand_Commandments_2021.pdf.
20. Economists estimate that growth in federal regulation since 1949 had reduced economic output in 2011 by nearly $40 trillion. See, e.g., John W. Dawson and John J. Seater, “Federal regulation and aggregate economic growth,” Journal of Economic Growth (2013), https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10887-013-9088-y.
21. Economists estimate that growth in federal regulation since 1980 had reduced economic output in 2012 by $4 trillion. See, e.g., Bentley Coffey et al., “The cumulative cost of regulations,” Review of Economic Dynamics (2020), https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S1094202520300223.
22. Regulatory Studies Center, “Rules published in the Federal Register by presidential year,” George Washington University (2022), https://regulatorystudies.columbian.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs4751/files/2022.06/federal_register_rules_presidential_year.xlsx.
23. Authors’ calculations based upon data provided by the National Archives and Records Administration on the total number of pages in final rules published between 2009 and 2016. See, e.g., Office of the Federal Register, “Federal Register and CFR publication statistics: Aggregated charts,” National Archives and Records Administration (2022), https://uploads.federalregister.gov/uploads/2022/06/17143841/FR-Stats-2021-combined-updated.pdf.
24. Between 2009 and 2016, nearly 3,000 rules were finalized that estimated the economic impact of the new regulation. Those rules had an estimated cost of $870 billion. See, e.g., RegRodeo, “Regulation Rodeo,” American Action Forum (2022), https://regrodeo.com.
25. Reince Priebus, “Memorandum for the heads of executive departments and agencies: Regulatory freeze pending review,” Office of Management and Budget (2017), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2017-01-24/pdf/2017.01766.pdf.
26. Clyde Wayne Crews Jr., “Ten thousand commandments: An annual snapshot of the federal regulatory state,” Competitive Enterprise Institute (2021), https://cei.org/wp.content/uploads/2021/06/Ten_Thousand_Commandments_2021.pdf.
27. Executive Order 13771 (2017), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2017-02-03/pdf/2017-02451.pdf.
29. Dominic J. Mancini, “Guidance implementing Executive Order 13771, titled ‘Reducing regulation and controlling regulatory costs,’” Office of Management and Budget (2017), https://web.archive.org/web/20200722041126/https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/memora nda/2017/M-17-21-OMB.pdf.
30. Executive Order 13891 (2019), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2019-10-15/pdf/2019-22623.pdf.
31. Executive Order 13892 (2019), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2019-10-15/pdf/2019-22624.pdf.
32. Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, “Regulatory reform under Executive Order 13771: Final accounting for fiscal year 2020,” Office of Management and Budget (2020), https://www.reginfo.gov/public/pdf/eo13771/EO_13771_Final_Accounting_for_Fiscal_Year_2020.pdf.
33. Executive Order 13992 (2021), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-01-25/pdf/2021-01767.pdf.
34. Authors’ calculations based upon data provided by the National Archives and Records Administration on the number of pages published in the Federal Register between Inauguration Day and 12 months later, disaggregated by presidential administration.
35. Regulatory Studies Center, “Cumulative economically significant final rules by administration,” George Washington University (2022), https://regulatorystudies.columbian.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs4751/files/2022.06/gwregstudies_cumaltiveecsigfinalrules_4.31.22.xlsx.
36. Authors’ calculations based upon data provided by the American Action Forum on published regulatory costs, disaggregated by year. See, e.g., RegRodeo, “Regulation Rodeo,” American Action Forum (2022), https://regrodeo.com.
38. Authors’ calculations based upon data provided by the Office of Management and Budget on the number of rules reviewed, disaggregated by economically significant status. See, e.g., Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, “EO review counts,” Office of Management and Budget (2022), https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eoCountsSearch.
39. Between January 21, 1993 and January 19, 2021, the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs reviewed 17,474 regulations, with 2,953 of those regulations (16.9 percent) considered economically significant. Between January 21, 2021 and July 11, 2021, the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs reviewed 649 regulations, with 221 of those regulations (34.1 percent) considered economically significant.
40. Authors’ calculations based upon data provided by the U.S. Department of Labor on the year-over-year change in seasonally adjusted consumer price index. See, e.g., Bureau of Labor Statistics, “CPI for all urban consumers: All items in U.S. city average, seasonally adjusted,” U.S. Department of Labor (2022), https://data.bls.gov/timeseries/CUSR0000SA0.
42. Hayden Dublois and Jonathan Ingram, “The ‘Bidenflation’ crisis: How expanded welfare benefits and labor shortages are driving up prices,” Foundation for Government Accountability (2022), https://thefga.org/paper/bidenflation-crisis.
43. Josh Wingrove and Jordan Fabian, “Biden says he’s focused on inflation, but again blames Putin,” Bloomberg News (2022), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-06-10/biden-says-he-s-focused-on-inflation-but.again-blames-putin.
44. Bradford Betz, “White House shifts from blaming Putin to oil companies for high gas prices, calls on them to ‘be patriots,’” Fox Business News (2022), https://www.foxbusiness.com/politics/white-house-shifts-blaming-putin-oil.companies-high-gas-prices-patriots.
45. David Rutz, “Biden the blamer: White House pins inflation, high gas prices on Putin, corporate greed, COVID-19 and more,” Fox News (2022), https://www.foxnews.com/media/biden-the-blamer-white-house-inflation-high-gas.prices-on-putin-corporate-greed-covid-19-and-more.
46. Taylor Penley, “Gas station owners hit back after Biden blames them for high prices: ‘So untethered from reality,’” Fox News (2022), https://www.foxnews.com/media/gas-station-owners-hit-back-biden-blames-high.prices-untethered-reality.
47. Hayden Dublois and Jonathan Ingram, “The ‘Bidenflation’ crisis: How expanded welfare benefits and labor shortages are driving up prices,” Foundation for Government Accountability (2022), https://thefga.org/paper/bidenflation-crisis.
48. Òscar Jordà et al., Hayden “Why Is U.S. inflation higher than in other countries?” Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco (2022), https://www.frbsf.org/economic-research/publications/economic-letter/2022/march/why-is-us.inflation-higher-than-in-other-countries.
49. On his first day in office, President Biden issued an executive order cancelling the permit for the Keystone XL pipeline and suspended the oil and gas leasing program in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge. See, e.g., Executive Order 13990 (2021), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2021-01-25/pdf/2021-01765.pdf.
50. After a federal court struck down Biden’s ban on oil and gas leasing, it temporarily resumed leasing activities— reducing acreage available for lease by 80 percent—before once again pausing and cancelling all remaining oil and gas lease sales. See, e.g., Tyler O’Neil, “Biden admin cancels massive oil and gas lease sale amid record-high gas prices,” Fox Business News (2022), https://www.foxbusiness.com/politics/biden-admin-cancels-oil-gas-lease-sale.record-high-prices.
51. Emma Newburger, “Biden pauses new oil and gas leases amid legal battle over cost of climate change,” CNBC (2022), https://www.cnbc.com/2022/02/24/biden-administration-pausing-new-oil-and-gas-leases-amid-legal-battle..html.
52. The Securities and Exchange Commission has proposed climate-related disclosure requirements that, according to one SEC commissioner, are “designed to push capital allocation toward politically and socially favored ends.” See, e.g., Hester M. Peirce, “We are not the Securities and Environment Commission – At least not yet,” Securities and Exchange Commission (2022), https://www.sec.gov/news/statement/peirce-climate-disclosure-20220321.
53. The Department of Labor has proposed requiring retirement fund managers include “environmental, social and governance” factors in making investment decisions. See, e.g., Lawrence A. Cunningham, “Biden administration wants ESG to factor in employee retirement funds: That mandate would hurt workers,” Market Watch (2021), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/biden-administration-wants-esg-to-factor-in-employee-retirement-funds-that.mandate-would-hurt-workers-11635406359.
54. Jonathan Ingram, “It’s not just spending — Biden’s record regulations are driving inflation too,” New York Post (2022), https://nypost.com/2022/05/23/its-not-just-spending-bidens-record-regulations-are-driving-inflation-too.
55. Dustin Chambers et al., “How do federal regulations affect consumer prices? An analysis of the regressive effects of regulation,” Public Choice (2017), https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11127-017-0479-z.
56. Tamara Keith, “Wielding a pen and a phone, Obama goes it alone,” National Public Radio (2014), https://www.npr.org/2014/01/20/263766043/wielding-a-pen-and-a-phone-obama-goes-it-alone.
58. West Virginia v. Environmental Protection Agency, 597 U.S. ___ (2022), https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/21pdf/20-1530_n758.pdf.
59. Regulations from the Executive in Need of Scrutiny Act of 2021, S. 68 (2021), https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/senate-bill/68.
60. Regulations from the Executive in Need of Scrutiny Act of 2011, H.R. 10 (2011), https://www.congress.gov/bill/112th-congress/house-bill/10.
61. Regulations from the Executive in Need of Scrutiny Act of 2013, H.R. 367 (2013), https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/367.
62. Regulations from the Executive in Need of Scrutiny Act of 2015, H.R. 427 (2015), https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/427.
63. Regulations from the Executive in Need of Scrutiny Act of 2017, H.R. 26 (2015), https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/26.
64. Florida Statutes § 120.541(3) (2021), http://www.leg.state.fl.us/statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&Search_String=&URL=0100.0199/0120/Sections/0120.541.html.
65. West Virginia Code § 29A-3-9 (2022), https://code.wvlegislature.gov/pdf/29A-3-9.
66. Wisconsin Statutes § 227.139 (2022), https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/statutes/statutes/227/ii/139.
67. West Virginia Code § 29A-3-2 (2022), https://code.wvlegislature.gov/pdf/29A-3-2.
68. West Virginia Code § 29A-3-9 (2022), https://code.wvlegislature.gov/pdf/29A-3-9.
69. These regulatory review requirements apply to “legislative rules,” defined by West Virginia law as rules with the force of law, rules that supply a basis for the imposition of civil or criminal liability, or rules that grant or deny a specific benefit.
70. West Virginia Code § 29A-3-11 (2022), https://code.wvlegislature.gov/pdf/29A-3-11.
71. West Virginia Code § 29A-3-12 (2022), https://code.wvlegislature.gov/pdf/29A-3-12.
72. West Virginia Code § 29A-3-9 (2022), https://code.wvlegislature.gov/pdf/29A-3-9.
73. Florida Statutes § 120.541(3) (2021), http://www.leg.state.fl.us/statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&Search_String=&URL=0100.0199/0120/Sections/0120.541.html.
74. Eric H. Miller and Donald J. Rubottom, “Legislative rule ratification: Lessons from the first four years,” Florida Bar Journal (2015), https://www.floridabar.org/the-florida-bar-journal/legislative-rule-ratification-lessons-from-the.first-four-years.
75. Letter from Governor Rick Scott to Secretary Kenneth W. Detzner (2017), https://www.flgov.com/wp.content/uploads/2017/05/SLA-BIZHUB17052419090.pdf.
76. Wisconsin Statutes § 227.139 (2022), https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/statutes/statutes/227/ii/139.
77. Wisconsin Statutes § 227.19(5)(dm) (2022), https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/statutes/statutes/227/ii/19/5/dm.
78. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
79. Florida Statutes § 120.541(3) (2021), http://www.leg.state.fl.us/statutes/index.cfm?App_mode=Display_Statute&Search_String=&URL=0100.0199/0120/Sections/0120.541.html.
80. West Virginia Code § 29A-3-9 (2022), https://code.wvlegislature.gov/pdf/29A-3-9.
81. Wisconsin Statutes § 227.139 (2022), https://docs.legis.wisconsin.gov/statutes/statutes/227/ii/139.
82. Colorado Statutes § 24-4-103(8), https://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/info_center/laws/Title24/Title24Article4.html.
83. Maine Statutes § 8072, https://legislature.maine.gov/statutes/5/title5sec8072.html.
84. Arkansas Constitution, Article 5, Section 42, https://ballotpedia.org/Article_5,_Arkansas_Constitution#Section_42.
85. Utah Code § 63G-3-502(2)(a), https://le.utah.gov/xcode/Title63G/Chapter3/63G-3-S502.html.
86. Authors’ calculations based upon data provided by the American Action Forum on published regulatory costs, disaggregated by year. See, e.g., RegRodeo, “Regulation Rodeo,” American Action Forum (2022), https://regrodeo.com.