



# FLORIDA LEADS THE WAY IN HOLDING ROGUE PROSECUTORS AND CITIES ACCOUNTABLE

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# KEY FINDINGS



SOME DISTRICT ATTORNEYS ARE  
FAILING TO PROSECUTE CRIMINALS.



ROGUE DISTRICT ATTORNEYS REPLACE THE LAW OF  
THE LAND WITH **THEIR PERSONAL IDEOLOGY**.  
THE VICTIMS ARE THE VERY COMMUNITIES  
THE DISTRICT ATTORNEYS PURPORT TO SERVE.



**FLORIDA IS A MODEL FOR OTHER STATES**  
TO HOLD ROGUE PROSECUTORS ACCOUNTABLE.



**FLORIDA GRANTS THE GOVERNOR AUTHORITY**  
TO REMOVE ROGUE PROSECUTORS, HAS A  
MECHANISM TO ASSIGN ANOTHER PROSECUTOR  
TO THE DUTIES NEGLECTED BY THE ROGUE  
PROSECUTOR, AND BANS SANCTUARY CITIES.

## THE BOTTOM LINE:

**STATES SHOULD FOLLOW FLORIDA'S LEAD TO  
HOLD ROGUE PROSECUTORS ACCOUNTABLE  
AND ENHANCE PUBLIC SAFETY.**

## Overview

District attorneys, also known as prosecuting attorneys, district attorneys general, or state attorneys depending on the state, are central figures in their community for criminal justice. District attorneys represent the state in criminal cases and are elected or appointed to uphold the law. Prosecutorial discretion plays a role in the criminal justice process, but when a district attorney allows his or her jurisdiction to become sanctuaries for crime, accountability is needed.

Rogue district attorneys, often backed by left-wing billionaire George Soros, are a problem nationwide.<sup>1</sup> These district attorneys replace the law with their personal ideology. Soros and his followers peddle their soft-on-crime actions as reform-minded, but American communities are paying the price for these reckless experiments. Rogue district attorneys let entire categories of criminals walk free.



This is, however, not the case in Florida. Other states can look to Florida for examples of how to hold rogue prosecutors accountable. Governor Ron DeSantis has removed two rogue prosecutors for neglecting their duties.<sup>2-3</sup> The governor also can assign a new prosecutor when a district attorney is neglecting their duties. States should follow Florida's lead to hold rogue prosecutors accountable and protect their communities and victims of crime.

At the core of this conversation is an important, philosophical difference. The Left absolves criminals of their responsibility for their crimes. They claim that individual wrongdoing is not the individual's error, but a societal flaw. But allowing the guilty to walk free fails to protect the innocent. Laws must be upheld to protect our communities, and most importantly, to safeguard liberty. Governor DeSantis has taken action to ensure justice is restored in Florida by holding rogue prosecutors accountable.<sup>4-5</sup>

## Some district attorneys are failing to prosecute criminals.

### Rogue prosecutors undermine public safety by failing to prosecute criminals.

In Chicago, Kim Foxx dropped charges against 30 percent of felony defendants in 2020.<sup>6</sup> She was elected with the help of George Soros in 2016 and the murder rate rose on her watch to a 30-year high.<sup>7</sup> After seven years, she is not seeking reelection.<sup>8</sup>

St. Louis became a bastion for crime under Soros-funded District Attorney Kim Gardner. Gardner's tenure became known for allowing criminals to walk free.<sup>9</sup> A judge once disqualified Gardner from a case for initiating prosecution for political purposes.<sup>10</sup> Another time, a judge declared Gardner's office had "essentially abandoned its duty to prosecute those it charges with crimes" upon Gardner's inaction with a murder case.<sup>11</sup>

In New York, Alvin Bragg (who received money from both the Soros family and George Soros’s political action committees) released a public statement declaring he would not prosecute traffic infractions and other non-criminal offenses, as well as resisting arrest, prostitution, and more.<sup>12-14</sup> Other offenses like commercial burglaries, residential burglaries, or drug cases would be downgraded.<sup>15</sup> Several lawyers who worked with the Manhattan District Attorney’s Office quit as a result.<sup>16</sup>



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## **Rogue district attorneys replace the law of the land with their personal ideology. The victims are the very communities the district attorneys purport to serve.**

Unfortunately, these rogue district attorneys do not believe in law and order. Often, they have been hand-picked and bankrolled by left-leaning billionaires. They act more like political activists rather than prosecutors. Instead of seeking to change state laws, often a laborious process, billionaires like George Soros and his allies fund district attorneys who simply refuse to enforce those laws—a shortcut to achieve a similar result where crime goes unchecked.<sup>17</sup>

Unsurprisingly, the Biden administration sides with rogue district attorneys. One such district attorney, Rachael Rollins, is known for her public declarations to allow entire categories of crime to go unprosecuted. Vice President Kamala Harris cast the tie-breaking vote to nominate Rachael Rollins to U.S. Attorney for the District of Massachusetts.<sup>18</sup> Worse, every Democratic senator voted for this prosecutor who publicly declared support for lawlessness.<sup>19</sup> Rollins has since resigned over allegations of abusing power.<sup>20</sup> But when she was the Suffolk County District Attorney, Rollins famously released a policy memo highlighting 15 crimes she would not prosecute.<sup>21</sup> The crimes included trespassing, shoplifting, breaking and entering, and wanton or malicious destruction of property.<sup>22</sup>



**VICE PRESIDENT KAMALA HARRIS CAST THE TIE-BREAKING VOTE TO NOMINATE RACHAEL ROLLINS TO U.S. ATTORNEY FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS.**

Though district attorneys are not the only factor for crime prevention, when prosecutors promise not to prosecute, the result is often increased crime.<sup>23</sup> Rogue district attorneys do a disservice to the very communities they profess to serve.

While at one time this was only commonplace in blue cities and states, the movement has now stretched across the country. Only some states are taking action.

Though lawmakers in most states are wrestling with this problem, Florida leads the way in effectively holding rogue prosecutors accountable.

## **Florida is a model for other states to hold rogue prosecutors accountable.**

Although the above examples may be fitting for Democrat-run states, the state of Florida also has experience with rogue prosecutors. However, Florida's governor has taken action to hold rogue prosecutors accountable by removing them in two instances.



### **FLORIDA'S GOVERNOR HAS TAKEN ACTION TO HOLD ROGUE PROSECUTORS ACCOUNTABLE BY REMOVING THEM IN TWO INSTANCES.**

Two district attorneys, known as state attorneys in Florida, have been suspended in the Sunshine State: Andrew Warren in August 2022 and Monique Worrell in August 2023.<sup>24-25</sup>

**Governor DeSantis suspended Soros-funded State Attorney Andrew Warren of the 13th Judicial Circuit via executive order.**<sup>26-27</sup> Warren was removed from public office for neglect of duty and incompetence as allowed by the Florida Constitution. Warren established a "presumption of non-prosecution" policy, meaning he would not pursue charges for certain criminal violations, including trespassing at a business location, disorderly conduct, disorderly intoxication, and prostitution.<sup>28</sup>

In several cases, Warren signed onto statements pledging to not prosecute particular individuals if the legislature were to ever criminalize certain acts.<sup>29-30</sup> Some of these acts were not crimes under Florida law at the time, providing more evidence that Warren acted according to his personal ideology. These statements reflect that of an activist, not a prosecutor.

**Just one year later in August 2023, Governor DeSantis issued an executive order to suspend Florida's state attorney for the Ninth Judicial Circuit, Monique Worrell.**<sup>31</sup> Monique Worrell and her predecessor, Aramis Ayala, each received more than \$1 million from George Soros.<sup>32</sup> Worrell had intentionally allowed offenders, including pedophiles and violent offenders, to evade incarceration.<sup>33</sup> She was especially lenient with offenders under the age of 25.<sup>34</sup>

Indeed, 42 percent of juvenile felony cases were dismissed in Worrell's circuit between November 2021 and November 2022, the highest in the state.<sup>35</sup> Florida's Ninth Judicial Circuit dismissed 29 percent of firearm felonies committed by juveniles and 41 percent of violent felonies.<sup>36</sup> Worrell's circuit also had the lowest prison admission rates for assault on a law enforcement officer, resisting arrest with violence, and among the lowest for robbery with a weapon and DUI offenses from January 2022 to March 2023.<sup>37</sup>

## ACCORDING TO THE EXECUTIVE ORDER:

- The Osceola County Sheriff's Office referred 58 non-homicide **Robbery with a Firearm** cases to the Ninth Circuit in 2021 and 2022.

**ONLY ONE** of those cases resulted in the minimum mandatory sentence.

- During the same two-year period, the Osceola County Sheriff's Office referred 11 non-homicide **Carjacking with a Firearm** cases to the Ninth Circuit.

**ONLY ONE** resulted in the minimum mandatory sentence.

- The Ninth Circuit also received 14 non-homicide cases involving **Home Invasion Robbery with a Firearm** from the Osceola County Sheriff's Office, yet...

**NOT ONE** of those arrests resulted in the minimum mandatory sentence.

*Source: Florida Office of the Governor*



Thankfully, Governor DeSantis appointed State Attorney Suzy Lopez to fill the vacancy left by Andrew Warren in Florida's 13th Judicial Circuit.<sup>38</sup> Lopez's office has repaired relationships with law enforcement and has taken a strong stance against gun violence.<sup>39</sup> As a result, the percentage of gun-related juvenile cases prosecuted as adults has increased by more than 20 percent.<sup>40</sup> Similarly, the newly appointed state attorney in Florida's Ninth Judicial Circuit said he will ensure the justice system operates consistently, and with transparency—an about-face from the prior administration.<sup>41</sup>

## Florida grants the governor authority to remove rogue prosecutors, has a mechanism to assign another prosecutor to the duties neglected by the rogue prosecutor, and bans sanctuary cities.

Florida leads the way in holding rogue state attorneys accountable. **First, Florida law allows the governor to remove rogue prosecutors.**<sup>42</sup> In Florida, a state attorney is a constitutional officer, with independent stature within Florida's government.<sup>43</sup> While the governor cannot suspend a state attorney for policy differences, the state constitution grants the governor the authority to suspend a state attorney for neglect of duty, incompetence, and other failures.<sup>44</sup>

**Second, Florida has a mechanism to assign another prosecutor to the duties neglected by the rogue prosecutor.**<sup>45</sup> Separate from the removal of a rogue prosecutor, the governor may by executive order assign another state attorney to a circuit, or to one or more problematic cases in that circuit, when the sitting state attorney is disqualified.<sup>46</sup> This ensures criminals are prosecuted and holds rogue prosecutors accountable.

Tennessee has also ensured that rogue prosecutors are held accountable. In the Volunteer State, if any district attorney makes public statements refusing to prosecute certain crimes, the attorney general may appoint a district attorney pro tem for that district.<sup>47</sup> Tennessee went a step further and codified this policy into statute.



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**Finally, Florida banned so-called “sanctuary cities” that permit illegal activity.**<sup>48</sup> Similar to the rogue prosecutors that put personal ideology above the law, these jurisdictions defy federal immigration law.<sup>49</sup> They risk the safety of American communities for political gain as they willfully refuse to comply with federal law, reject detainer requests from the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and refuse to share important information with ICE.<sup>50-51</sup> Some states, including New Jersey and Illinois, allow this practice statewide.<sup>52</sup>

In sanctuary cities, police departments often shy away from holding illegal immigrants for fear of lawsuits.<sup>53</sup> A detective in Colorado told Congress how the sanctuary city ordinance forbids him from contacting ICE altogether, threatening termination should he disobey.<sup>54</sup> ICE agents are invaluable in keeping felons off the streets, as well as the large amounts of illegal opioids the felons hope to traffic. Sanctuary cities invite criminals.

Florida does not stand for political activism that threatens to harm American families. Other states looking for solutions to handle rogue prosecutors should look to Florida, where rogue prosecutors are held accountable for failing to prosecute crimes. Moreover, Florida’s efforts to hold rogue prosecutors accountable deter other rogue district attorneys from infiltrating the state. Lawmakers in other states should demand similar accountability to push back on activist prosecutors.

## **THE BOTTOM LINE: States should follow Florida’s lead to remove rogue prosecutors and enhance public safety.**

Rogue prosecutors and an overall lack of accountability are a problem in this country. Activist district attorneys veto laws rather than enforce them. Sanctuary cities attract criminals and make communities bastions for crime.

This is a nationwide problem and states are looking for solutions. In Pennsylvania, for example, lawmakers continue their attempts to impeach Philadelphia’s rogue District Attorney Larry Krasner.<sup>55</sup> Under the Pennsylvania Constitution, prosecutors may be impeached based on misbehaviors in office, and the legislature says he has been derelict in his obligations to the victims of crime and the city of Philadelphia.<sup>56-57</sup> Similar efforts are being made across the country.

Florida offers commonsense solutions: granting the governor the authority to remove rogue prosecutors and the ability to assign another prosecutor to the duties neglected by the rogue prosecutor. By banning sanctuary cities, Florida ensures its law enforcement officers can communicate with federal partners to hold criminals accountable.

**Florida offers commonsense solutions: granting the governor the authority to remove rogue prosecutors and the ability to assign another prosecutor to the duties neglected by the rogue prosecutor.**

**To uphold law and order across the state, lawmakers should hold rogue prosecutors accountable and ban sanctuary cities.** When rogue prosecutors and cities wield a veto pen, public safety and individual liberty are endangered.

States should look to freedom-loving Florida, where families have a safer place to call home.

### OTHER EXAMPLES OF HOW STATES ARE REINING IN ROGUE PROSECUTORS

<b>Arkansas</b>	The governor, after addressing the General Assembly, may remove prosecuting attorneys. <sup>58</sup>
<b>New York</b>	With the exception of counties within New York City, the governor may remove any elected district attorney. <sup>59</sup>
<b>North Dakota</b>	The governor may remove a state attorney for neglect of duty, etc. <sup>60</sup>
<b>Ohio</b>	If one or more taxpayers have filed complaints, the court of common pleas can remove a district attorney and declare the office vacant, if the court finds the attorney has neglected their duty, etc. <sup>61</sup>
<b>Tennessee</b>	The attorney general may petition the court to appoint a district attorney pro tem for a local district attorney that is negligent, etc. <sup>62</sup>
<b>Texas</b>	Qualified residents may file with the local court to remove incompetent county officers, including district attorneys. <sup>63</sup>
<b>Washington</b>	The governor can request the attorney general to prosecute crimes when the district attorney refuses. <sup>64</sup>

*Source: Author’s analysis of state laws*



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