With Reform, TANF Can Lift American Families Out of Dependency

Overview

Both political parties agree that the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program needs an overhaul.¹ As with any welfare program, scarce resources must be preserved for the truly needy. Sadly, structural issues allow—and even incentivize—states to exploit and manipulate the TANF program. Moreover, waste, fraud, and abuse are occurring, undermining the program and diverting already limited resources. The lack of attention to these issues by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), which administers TANF at the federal level, adds to the program’s inefficiencies. HHS is not taking fraud seriously and holding those at fault accountable.

TANF is a significant welfare program funded by both federal and state taxpayers. More than a million families—2.8 million people—receive TANF benefits each year.² The federal block grant totals $16.8 billion annually and is supplemented by state funding called maintenance of effort (MOE) expenditures.³ In 2022 alone, states spent a total of $31.3 billion in federal TANF and state MOE dollars.⁴

TANF’s purposes are broad and flexible, an intentional upgrade from the program’s predecessor, Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC). Another hallmark of the TANF program is a work requirement for able-bodied adults. Today’s TANF program is the result of a rare bipartisan reform, passed in 1996 by Congress and signed into law by Democratic President Bill Clinton.^5-6 The results of the work requirement have been great, as welfare caseloads have decreased and earned income has increased.^7-9 It’s a true success story and should act as a model for other welfare programs.

As sound as the work requirement policy is, the state flexibility for spending from the grant has created tension for accountability within the program. States can spend federal TANF and state MOE funds on the four TANF goals.¹⁰

While these four goals of TANF are well-intentioned and have produced some excellent results, they are vague enough that some states have pushed their limits—unintentionally or otherwise—to spend block grant dollars. This has shifted funding away from the original target: to help move individuals from welfare to work.

Work is the answer to help people escape dependency. TANF is temporary assistance. Work provides needy families with a long-term solution and a pathway to freedom. An innovative and modern TANF program will help to empower families, close loopholes and gimmicks, and ensure every dollar is spent effectively and on the core target agreed upon in 1996—to help working families achieve self-sufficiency. 

The TANF program has structural flaws that states exploit, preventing TANF from serving its intended purpose at the expense of the truly needy.

TANF requires states to meet certain “work participation” standards.  On paper, states must ensure that half of work-eligible TANF cases have enrollees who are working, looking for work, or participating in job training programs.^12-13 In 2022, just seven states met this threshold.¹⁴ Among the 545,000 “work eligible” cases, just 194,000 were engaged in sufficient work activities—far below the 50 percent threshold.¹⁵ Indeed, more than 54 percent of “work-eligible” able-bodied adults reported zero hours of work activities nationwide.¹⁶

States can lower this 50 percent requirement through caseload reduction and increased spending.^17-18 In 2022, these adjustments lowered states’ minimum work participation rate to zero in 34 states.¹⁹ Just six states were subject to the 50 percent threshold.²⁰ Congress took steps to partially address this issue by recalibrating states’ caseload reduction credits to the change in enrollment since 2015, rather than 2005, but this provision does not take effect until 2026.²¹

But even under the recalibration, the adjustments will still lower minimum work participation rates to zero in approximately 19 states and only increase the average minimum work participation rate by two percentage points.²² Unfortunately, states can also still exploit the measurement with “excess” maintenance of effort spending. The House-passed Limit, Save, Grow Act would recalibrate those credits to fiscal year 2022 and eliminate the excess spending credit.²³

To make matters worse, states have used “worker supplement” schemes to further game work participation rates. Under this scheme, states go out and search for already-employed individuals not enrolled in TANF, but who are often enrolled in other welfare programs like food stamps or Medicaid. Once identified, states enroll those individuals into a separate program that pays a nominal monthly benefit. These individuals—all of whom are known to be employed at the time of enrollment—are then counted as working TANF enrollees for purposes of the work participation rate. These enrollees are also typically exempt from other TANF rules. About half of states currently operate these programs, and these monthly benefits are as low as a single dollar in some states.

Congress also took steps to partially address this scheme by requiring states to increase these nominal payments to at least $35 per month starting in fiscal year 2026.²⁴ However, it is likely that this minimum threshold will do little to close the loophole. When Congress established a similar minimum threshold to crack down on the standard utility allowance loophole, 13 of the 17 states abusing the loophole simply increased payments to meet the new threshold.²⁵

Even if states do not meet the weakened work participation rate requirements, there is little risk of serious penalties. Although federal law allows HHS to reduce states’ block grants for failure to meet these standards, penalties can be reduced or waived in three cases: 1) based on the “degree of noncompliance,” 2) when HHS finds “reasonable cause” for the failure, or 3) when states enter “corrective compliance plans.”^26-27

California, for example, has failed one or both of the work participation rate requirements every single year for the last 15 years. Although federal officials assessed nearly $1.9 billion in penalties for these failures, they later reduced those penalties to just $64 million.²⁸

When creating TANF, Congress intentionally departed from the AFDC method of a direct cash welfare entitlement, instead tying welfare to work. Yet only 21 percent of adult TANF recipients are working today, largely because of these inefficiencies and loopholes.²⁹ And the program continues to divert spending to non-work purposes.

Work is supposed to be central to TANF, but the program has strayed from this mission.

One of the TANF program’s core purposes is to end dependency on government benefits by promoting work and job preparation.³⁰ But states spend little TANF funding on work activities designed to move people from welfare to self-sufficiency. In 2022, only $2.9 billion—nine percent of total TANF funds—was spent on work supports and work, education, and training programs designed to help move someone from welfare to work.³¹ TANF and MOE line items for Pre-K and Head Start, refundable tax credits, and general program management each exceed total spending on job training, education, and other work-related activities.³²

Lawmakers must reform TANF to address fraud that diverts resources away from work and the truly needy.

Some welfare lobbyists have suggested that adding more cash onto EBT cards or keeping people on the program indefinitely is the answer to the funding questions in TANF. But expanding funding would do nothing to improve outcomes.

At the start of 2022, states had more than $7.5 billion in TANF funds carried over from previous years.³³ While this certainly represents a large sum of money, surpluses in TANF provide necessary cushions during economic downturns. These balances are reflective of an economy in which jobs are plentiful and people are moving off the caseload. If every dollar is spent down from the grant every year, it ignores the real potential for a downturn in the job market that may drive some families back to assistance. These contingencies help to avoid new taxpayer funding streams, like the additional $1 billion sent to TANF in the 2021 American Rescue Plan Act.³⁴

Without question, there is a fraud and misuse problem in TANF. Accounts of welfare cash going to improper uses are easy to find—both on the provider front and on the recipient side.

Unfortunately, HHS collects no information at all to monitor improper payments in TANF—unlike other major welfare programs.³⁵ However, the few audits conducted by the Office of Inspector General (OIG) have illustrated widespread abuse. In Michigan, for example, 40 percent of TANF cash welfare spending was flagged as improper.³⁶ In New York, auditors found an improper payment rate of 46 percent for TANF cash welfare payments.³⁷ Additionally, more than 21 percent of TANF cash welfare spending in Ohio and nearly 10 percent of TANF cash welfare payments in Minnesota were identified as improper.^38-39

Individual cases of TANF fraud and abuse abound at the Department of Justice, everything from enrollees lying about their income to receive benefits to government employees trading $1.4 million in TANF funds for cash and sex.^40-41 Federal prosecutors have even gone after TANF directors for enrolling ineligible individuals as part of a kickback scheme and states for using TANF funds on ineligible aliens.^42-43

HHS also collects no meaningful data on Electronic Benefit Transfer (EBT) card trafficking, despite its growing connection to the drug trade. In Lewiston, Maine, for example, law enforcement raided a drug dealer’s apartment, finding guns, $4,500 in cash, cocaine, and five EBT cards belonging to other people—what the prosecutor referred to as “a common currency for drugs.”⁴⁴ Another Lewiston case involved the Maine Drug Enforcement Agency (Maine DEA) raiding a dealer after receiving a tip that he was in possession of drugs and 20 EBT cards.⁴⁵ Maine DEA identified at least 25 separate raids related to crack cocaine, heroin, fentanyl, prescription opioids, and other drugs in an 11-month window where they seized EBT cards belonging to others, typically known drug users.⁴⁶ Prosecutors in other states have found similar EBT trafficking as part of the drug trade.^47-51

Even when not traded directly for drugs, enrollees often trade these EBT cards for cash or prohibited items.^52-53 USDA estimated that $1.3 billion in food stamp funds were trafficked annually between 2015 and 2017.⁵⁴ More than one in five small grocery stores and convenience stores accepting EBT are believed to be trafficking benefits.⁵⁵ These small stores make up nearly 56 percent of all authorized retailers in the food stamp program.⁵⁶ Given the fact that food stamp spending grew by nearly 80 percent between 2017 and 2022, actual EBT trafficking costs are likely far higher than the 2015-2017 estimate, as it is even more lucrative for criminals today.⁵⁷ While HHS unfortunately does not monitor EBT trafficking, food stamp benefits and TANF funds are loaded onto the same EBT cards and virtually all TANF enrollees also receive food stamps.⁵⁸

States have also used TANF as a slush fund, unconnected to the goal of moving families from welfare to work. California, for example, annually redirects TANF funding to a tuition grant program for nearly 650,000 college students.^59-60 California has diverted more than $1 billion per year from federal TANF funds to these grants.⁶¹ But eligibility for these TANF-funded grants has no real connection to furthering core TANF objectives.⁶² Indeed, analysts for California’s Joint Legislative Budget Committee internally refer to this scheme as a “fund swap” and “fund shift,” whereby the state uses TANF funds to replace General Fund expenses.⁶³ Those analysts have repeatedly said that the redirected TANF funds offset “an equal amount of General Fund support” and that these fund swaps have “no programmatic impact.”^64-65 To make matters worse, the state then uses these tuition grants to expand food stamp eligibility to college students who would not otherwise qualify.⁶⁶

Other states have engaged in similar patterns. Michigan, for example, spends $100 million of TANF funding on aid for college students, including millions for families earning more than $100,000 per year.⁶⁷ In 2023, HHS identified at least eight states that were spending TANF funds on college scholarship programs for adults without children.⁶⁸ These are just a few examples of states using TANF funding to replace General Fund expenses, though there are many more.⁶⁹

There are billions spent in other questionable ways that do not get as many headlines. There is more than $2 billion in state MOE and TANF funds that go towards refundable tax credits in states like New York, New Jersey, Massachusetts, and Minnesota.⁷⁰

States also abuse TANF to expand dependency—the exact opposite of its statutory purpose. Federal regulations have allowed states to greatly expand the definition of “needy” families to expand eligibility. HHS officials identified at least 40 states operating programs with TANF funding with eligibility levels more than twice the poverty line.⁷¹ In some states, individuals earning as much as five times the poverty line—roughly $156,000 for a family of four—can qualify for these programs.⁷²

Worse yet, states have used TANF as a way to expand other taxpayer-funded welfare programs. The food stamp program, for example, grants categorical eligibility to TANF enrollees, exempting them from the program’s income and asset limits.⁷³ Categorical eligibility was initially designed to avoid duplication for individuals applying for food stamps who were already subject to stricter income and asset limits in TANF.⁷⁴

States have exploited this loophole by using a small amount of TANF funding to print brochures, host a website, or operate a toll-free phone number that describes other welfare programs.⁷⁵ States then deem anyone who receives that information as someone receiving a TANF “benefit,” making them categorically eligible for food stamps and bypassing federal eligibility standards.⁷⁶

States do no eligibility verification for these fake “benefits.”⁷⁷ The brochures often reference services and programs that have no financial eligibility requirements, do not meet any of the required TANF purposes, and grant categorical eligibility even when no one in the household is eligible for any of the services listed.⁷⁸ Auditors at the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) warned that states were granting categorical eligibility for these “benefits” based on brochures that applicants did not even receive.⁷⁹

This loophole alone adds more than 5.4 million ineligible enrollees to the food stamp program each year, which will cost taxpayers more than $111 billion over the next decade.⁸⁰ In most states exploiting the loophole, individuals can have unlimited countable assets—such as cash or money deposited in bank accounts that is readily available—and still enroll in the program.⁸¹ Most enrollees with assets above the federal asset limit have more than $20,000 in countable resources, while more than 20 percent have $100,000 or more.⁸² In some cases, even millionaires have enrolled in the program.⁸³ This is particularly egregious when the primary purpose of TANF is to “end the dependence of needy parents on government benefits.”⁸⁴

Congress should eliminate this loophole by limiting what types of TANF-funded “benefits” can confer categorical eligibility to other welfare programs. One way to do this would be to restrict these “benefits” to individuals with income and resources below the income and resource limits of whichever program is granting categorical eligibility.

Work requirements in welfare programs work.

After implementing work requirements in welfare programs, states successfully moved millions from welfare to work. A dollar earned is more valuable than a dollar of welfare.⁸⁵ Welfare cash is temporary, but earnings from a job can provide lasting benefits that compound. Moreover, welfare can be socially isolating, while holding a job promotes dignity and has a positive impact on a person’s future.⁸⁶ States that implement work requirements have proven that work requirements move people into self-sufficiency.

TANF was designed around work, both for individuals and for states engaging able-bodied adults in work-related activities.⁸⁷ Since the work-centered 1996 welfare reform law was enacted, the caseload has plummeted. In 1995, nearly 13.7 million people were dependent on AFDC cash welfare.⁸⁸ By 2000, enrollment had been cut in half.⁸⁹ Today, TANF enrollment stands at 2.8 million, a drop of nearly 80 percent.⁹⁰ Just 830,000 of these enrollees are able-bodied adults—half of whom live in California.⁹¹ Better still, single mothers leaving welfare after the 1996 reforms entered the labor force in record numbers, boosting economic growth and leading to declines in child poverty.^92-93

States adopting stronger work requirements and time limits have led to more employment, higher incomes, and less dependency.⁹⁴ Able-bodied adults who left dependency found work in more than 600 different industries, touching every corner of the economy.⁹⁵ Those families saw their incomes more than double within a year of leaving welfare, with higher wages more than offsetting the welfare checks they used to receive.⁹⁶ Moving able-bodied adults from welfare to work also helped boost the local economy and preserve limited taxpayer resources for the truly needy.⁹⁷

Work requirements in other welfare programs have also positively transformed lives.

For example:

The 1996 welfare reform law’s focus on work is desperately needed in other welfare programs today, where most able-bodied adults receiving taxpayer-funded benefits do not work at all.^104-105 Work requirements help people to move from welfare to self-sufficiency while preserving resources for the truly needy.

The Bottom Line: To promote work and protect the truly needy, Congress should rebalance TANF funding toward work-related activities and close existing loopholes.

States must be held accountable for their exploitation of loopholes like the work participation standard, worker supplements, broad-based categorical eligibility, and fund swaps which undermine program integrity. These loopholes keep needy families in a state of dependency and ultimately jeopardize resources intended for the truly needy. 

TANF must be re-focused around the self-sufficiency that only work can provide. States must dedicate a much higher share of TANF funding to work-related activities. And more guardrails are necessary. The government itself cannot act with compassion. It can only redistribute funds from taxpayers. Work, however, empowers individuals and can result in a lifetime of self-sufficiency and freedom. Work is the ultimate anti-poverty program, allowing families to care for each other in ways that a welfare program cannot.

REFERENCES

1 Committee on Ways and Means, “Work and welfare subcommittee hearing on ‘Where is all the welfare money going? Reclaiming TANF non-assistance dollars to lift Americans out of poverty,’” U.S. House of Representatives (2023), https://waysandmeans.house.gov/event/work-welfare-subcommittee-hearing-on-where-is-all-the-welfare-money-going-reclaiming-tanf-non-assistance-dollars-to-lift-americans-out-of-poverty. 

2 Administration for Children and Families, “TANF caseload data: Combined TANF and SSP-MOE – 2023,” U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (2024), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ofa/fy2023_tanssp_caseload.pdf.

3 Administration for Children and Families, “Fiscal year 2022 federal TANF and state MOE financial data,” U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (2023), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ofa/fy2022_tanf_and_moe_financial_data_table-final.pdf.

4 Ibid.

5 Public Law 104-193 (1996), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/PLAW-104publ193/pdf/PLAW-104publ193.pdf.

6 Library of Congress, “H.R. 3734: Actions,” Library of Congress (1996), https://www.congress.gov/bill/104th-congress/house-bill/3734/all-actions.

7 Administration for Children and Families, “TANF caseload data: Combined TANF and SSP-MOE – 2000,” U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (2004), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ofa/2000_15months_tanssp.pdf.

8 Administration for Children and Families, “TANF caseload data: Combined TANF and SSP-MOE – 2023,” U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (2024), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ofa/fy2023_tanssp_caseload.pdf.

9 Nic Horton and Jonathan Ingram, “Work requirements are working for Kansas families: How welfare reform increases incomes and improves lives,” Foundation for Government Accountability (2017), https://thefga.org/research/kansas-work-requirements.

10 42 U.S.C. § 601 (2022), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2022-title42/pdf/USCODE-2022-title42-chap7-subchapIV-partA-sec601.pdf.

11 Ibid.

12 42 U.S.C. § 607 (2022), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2022-title42/pdf/USCODE-2022-title42-chap7-subchapIV-partA-sec607.pdf.

13 States must meet a separate work participation standard for two-parent families on TANF.

14 Administration for Children and Families, “Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) and Separate State Programs – Maintenance of Effort (SSP-MOE) work participation rates and engagement in work activities: Fiscal year 2022,” U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (2023), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ofa/wpr_FY2022_final-web.pdf.

15 Ibid.

16 Ibid.

17 42 U.S.C. § 607(b)(3) (2022), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2022-title42/pdf/USCODE-2022-title42-chap7-subchapIV-partA-sec607.pdf.

18 45 C.F.R. § 261.43 (2023), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CFR-2023-title45-vol3/pdf/CFR-2023-title45-vol3-sec261-43.pdf.

19 Administration for Children and Families, “Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) and Separate State Programs – Maintenance of Effort (SSP-MOE) work participation rates and engagement in work activities: Fiscal year 2022,” U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (2023), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ofa/wpr_FY2022_final-web.pdf.

20 Ibid.

21 Public Law 118-5 (2023), https://www.congress.gov/118/plaws/publ5/PLAW-118publ5.pdf.

22 Authors’ calculations based upon data provided by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services on total caseloads in fiscal years 2005, 2015, and 2023. Changes in caseload between fiscal year 2023 and implementation of this new provision will affect the final count.

23 H.R. 2811 (2023), https://www.congress.gov/118/bills/hr2811/BILLS-118hr2811eh.pdf.

24 Public Law 118-5 (2023), https://www.congress.gov/118/plaws/publ5/PLAW-118publ5.pdf.

25 Food and Nutrition Service, “Regulatory impact analysis: Standard utility allowances based on the receipt of energy assistance payments under the Agricultural Act of 2014,” U.S. Department of Agriculture (2016), https://downloads.regulations.gov/FNS-2016-0044-0002/content.pdf.

26 42 U.S.C. § 609 (2022), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2022-title42/pdf/USCODE-2022-title42-chap7-subchapIV-partA-sec609.pdf.

27 45 C.F.R. § 262 (2023), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CFR-2023-title45-vol3/pdf/CFR-2023-title45-vol3-part262.pdf.

28 Legislative Analyst’s Office, “Overview of the Federal Fiscal Responsibility Act’s impacts on CalWORKs,” California Joint Legislative Budget Committee (2024), https://lao.ca.gov/Publications/Report/4877.

29 Administration for Children and Families, “Characteristics and financial circumstances of TANF recipients fiscal year  2022,” U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (2022),  https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ofa/fy2022_characteristics.pdf.

30 42 U.S.C. § 601 (2022), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2022-title42/pdf/USCODE-2022-title42-chap7-subchapIV-partA-sec601.pdf.

31 Administration for Children and Families, “FY 2022 Federal TANF & state MOE financial data,” U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (2023), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ofa/fy2022_tanf_and_moe_financial_data_table-final.pdf.

32 Ibid.

33  Administration for Children and Families, “Fiscal year 2022 federal TANF and state MOE financial data,” U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (2023), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ofa/fy2022_tanf_and_moe_financial_data_table-final.pdf.

34 Gene Falk and Patrick A. Landers, “Temporary assistance for needy families and proposed COVID-19 pandemic economic relief: in brief,” Congressional Research Service (2021), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R46692.

35 M. Hannah Padilla et al., “Improper payments: Key concepts and information on programs with high rates or lacking estimates,” Government Accountability Office (2024), https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-24-107482.pdf.

36 Office of Inspector General, “Review of improper Temporary Assistance for Needy Families basic assistance payments in Michigan for July 1 through December 31, 2005,” U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (2007), https://oig.hhs.gov/documents/audit/4646/A-05-06-00068-Complete%20Report.pdf.

37 Office of Inspector General, “Review of improper Temporary Assistance for Needy Families basic assistance payments in New York for July 1 through December 31, 2005,” U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (2007), https://oig.hhs.gov/documents/audit/3773/A-02-06-02015-Complete%20Report.pdf.

38 Office of Inspector General, “Review of improper Temporary Assistance for Needy Families basic assistance payments in Ohio for April 1, 2006 through March 31, 2007,” U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (2008), https://oig.hhs.gov/documents/audit/4303/A-04-07-03520-Complete%20Report.pdf.

39 Office of Inspector General, “Review of improper Temporary Assistance for Needy Families basic assistance payments in Minnesota for April 1, 2006 through March 31, 2007,” U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (2008), https://oig.hhs.gov/documents/audit/8329/A-07-07-01045-Complete%20Report.pdf.

40 U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Montana, “Federal Jury convicts Helena woman of lying about income to receive government assistance benefits,” U.S. Department of Justice (2023), https://www.justice.gov/usao-mt/pr/federal-jury-convicts-helena-woman-lying-about-income-receive-government-assistance.

41 U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia, “Former District government employee sentenced to 84 months in prison for scheme Involving over $1.4 million in fraudulently issued benefits,” U.S. Department of Justice (2019), https://www.justice.gov/usao-dc/pr/former-district-government-employee-sentenced-84-months-prison-scheme-involving-over-14.

42 U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Montana, “Former Blackfeet TANF director pleads guilty to massive welfare fraud after guardians uncover almost $300,000 in losses,” U.S. Department of Justice (2014), https://www.justice.gov/usao-mt/pr/former-blackfeet-tanf-director-pleads-guilty-massive-welfare-fraud-after-guardians.

43 Office of Public Affairs, “Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to pay $48.8 million to resolve federal government’s claims that it provided benefits to ineligible aliens,” U.S. Department of Justice (2015), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/commonwealth-pennsylvania-pay-488-million-resolve-federal-governments-claims-it-provided.

44 U.S. v. Paul Robinson, No. 2:14-cr-05-GZS (D. Me. 2014).

45 Mathew Cashman, “Testimony of Supervisory Special Agent Mathew Cashman in support of LD 607,” Maine Department of Public Safety (2015).

46 Ibid.

47 U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of Ohio, “Warrensville Heights man indicted on fentanyl, cocaine, firearms and food stamp fraud charges,” U.S. Department of Justice (2018), https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndoh/pr/warrensville-heights-man-indicted-fentanyl-cocaine-firearms-and-food-stamp-fraud.

48 U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Northern District of New York, “Schenectady man charged with distributing fentanyl and xanax,” U.S. Department of Justice (2024), https://www.justice.gov/usao-ndny/pr/schenectady-man-charged-distributing-fentanyl-and-xanax.

49 U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Ohio, “14 arrest warrants issued in alleged food stamp fraud, drug trafficking conspiracy,” U.S. Department of Justice (2015), https://www.justice.gov/usao-sdoh/pr/14-arrest-warrants-issued-alleged-food-stamp-fraud-drug-trafficking-conspiracy.

50 U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of New Jersey, “Ringleader of Gloucester City drug ring admits trafficking oxycodone, adderall, and xanax and engaging in SNAP fraud,” U.S. Department of Justice (2020), https://www.justice.gov/usao-nj/pr/ringleader-gloucester-city-drug-ring-admits-trafficking-oxycodone-adderall-and-xanax-and.

51 U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Western District of Missouri, “Milo woman sentenced for SNAP fraud, meth trafficking,” U.S. Department of Justice (2020), https://www.justice.gov/usao-wdmo/pr/milo-woman-sentenced-snap-fraud-meth-trafficking.

52 U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of New York, “Two defendants charged with stealing or misusing $20 million in Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program benefits,” U.S. Department of Justice (2024), https://www.justice.gov/usao-edny/pr/two-defendants-charged-stealing-or-misusing-20-million-supplemental-nutrition.

53 U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of New Jersey, “Camden, N.J., man admits that he exchanged more than $2.5 million in SNAP/food stamp benefits for cash,” U.S. Department of Justice (2013), https://www.justice.gov/usao-nj/pr/camden-nj-man-admits-he-exchanged-more-25-million-snapfood-stamp-benefits-cash.

54 Office of Policy Support, “The extent of trafficking in the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program: 2015–2017,” U.S. Department of Agriculture (2021), https://fns-prod.azureedge.us/sites/default/files/resource-files/Trafficking2015-2017-3.pdf.

55 Ibid.

56 Ibid.

57 Food and Nutrition Service, “Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program participation and cost,” U.S. Department of Agriculture (2024), https://fns-prod.azureedge.us/sites/default/files/resource-files/snap-annualsummary-9.pdf.

58 More than three-quarters of households receiving public assistance also receive food stamps. See, e.g., Census Bureau, “Current Population Survey: Annual social and economic supplement,” U.S. Department of Commerce (2024), https://data.census.gov/mdat.

59 In the 2023-2024 award year, California awarded Cal Grant A to 204,000 college students and Cal Grant B to 439,000 college students. TANF funding is not used for Cal Grant C programs. See, e.g., California Student Aid Commission, “2023-24 Cal Grant offered awardees,” California Student Aid Commission (2024), https://www.csac.ca.gov/sites/default/files/file-attachments/2023-24_cal_grant_program_offered_awardees.pdf.

60 In fiscal year 2019, federal TANF funds covered most Cal Grant program spending, though that had declined to approximately 40 percent by fiscal year 2021. See, e.g., Legislative Analyst’s Office, “The 2020-21 budget: California Student Aid Commission,” California Joint Legislative Budget Committee (2020), https://lao.ca.gov/reports/2020/4182/CSAC-022720.pdf.

61 Ibid.

62 State officials use TANF funding to cover grant costs for students who are unmarried, 25 or younger, and have family income of $50,000 or less. See, e.g., Legislative Analyst’s Office, “TANF and SLOF adjustments for Cal Grant program,” California Joint Legislative Budget Committee (2013), https://lao.ca.gov/Recommendations/Details/713.

63 Legislative Analyst’s Office, “The 2012-13 budget: California spending plan,” California Joint Legislative Budget Committee (2012), https://lao.ca.gov/reports/2012/bud/spending_plan/spending-plan-091312.aspx.

64 Ibid.

65 Legislative Analyst’s Office, “Summary of financial aid recommendations,” California Joint Legislative Budget Committee (2017), https://lao.ca.gov/Education/EdBudget/Details/24.

66 Michael Lemus, “California Student Aid Commission announces updates to Cal Grant equity framework (AB 1456), streamlining program with federal guidelines and reaching more students,” California Student Aid Commission (2021), https://www.csac.ca.gov/sites/main/files/file-attachments/california_student_aid_commission_announces_updates_to_cal_grant_equity_framework_ab_1456_20210407.pdf.

67 Mike Wilkinson, “How Michigan families get welfare for private colleges,” Detroit Free Press (2016), https://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/2016/10/05/welfare-private-college-michigan/91554312.

68 Administration for Children and Families, “Strengthening Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) as a safety net and work program,” U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (2023), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/10/02/2023-21169/strengthening-temporary-assistance-for-needy-families-tanf-as-a-safety-net-and-work-program.

69 California officials have previously explained that they use TANF carryover funds “to offset General Fund spending.” See, e.g., Legislative Analyst’s Office, “The 2024-25 budget: CalWORKs,” California Joint Legislative Budget Committee (2024), https://lao.ca.gov/reports/2024/4872/CalWORKs-Budget-030424.pdf.

70 Administration for Children and Families, “FY 2022 Federal TANF & state MOE financial data,” U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (2023), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ofa/fy2022_tanf_and_moe_financial_data_table-final.pdf.

71 Administration for Children and Families, “Strengthening Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) as a safety net and work program,” U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (2023), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2023/10/02/2023-21169/strengthening-temporary-assistance-for-needy-families-tanf-as-a-safety-net-and-work-program.

72 Ibid.

73 Jonathan Ingram and Nic Horton, “Closing the door to food stamp fraud: How ending broad-based categorical eligibility can protect the truly needy,” Foundation for Government Accountability (2018), https://thefga.org/research/closing-the-door-to-food-stamp-fraud-how-ending-broad-based-categorical-eligibility-can-protect-the-truly-needy.

74 Office of Inspector General, “FNS quality control process for SNAP error rate,” U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (2015), https://usdaoig.oversight.gov/sites/default/files/reports/2023-12/27601-0002-41.pdf.

75 Ibid.

76 Ibid.

77 Ibid.

78 Ibid.

79 Ibid.

80 Paige Terryberry, “How Congress can protect the truly needy and restore program integrity to food stamps by ending broad-based categorical eligibility,” Foundation for Government Accountability (2023), https://thefga.org/research/how-congress-can-protect-needy-by-ending-bbce.

81 Jonathan Ingram and Nic Horton, “Closing the door to food stamp fraud: How ending broad-based categorical eligibility can protect the truly needy,” Foundation for Government Accountability (2018), https://thefga.org/research/closing-the-door-to-food-stamp-fraud-how-ending-broad-based-categorical-eligibility-can-protect-the-truly-needy.

82 Ibid.

83 Ibid.

84 42 U.S.C. § 601 (2022), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2022-title42/pdf/USCODE-2022-title42-chap7-subchapIV-partA-sec601.pdf.

85 Sam Adolphsen, “To help the truly needy, lawmakers should fix the welfare pit—Not the imaginary welfare ‘cliff,’” Foundation for Government Accountability (2023), https://thefga.org/research/lawmakers-should-fix-the-welfare-pit.

86 Ibid.

87 42 U.S.C. § 607(b) (2022), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2022-title42/pdf/USCODE-2022-title42-chap7-subchapIV-partA-sec607.pdf.

88 Administration for Children and Families, “AFDC caseload data: Total caseload – 1995,” U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (2004), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/ofa/data/caseload-data-1995-afdc-total.

89 Administration for Children and Families, “TANF caseload data: Combined TANF and SSP-MOE – 2000,” U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (2004), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ofa/2000_15months_tanssp.pdf.

90 Administration for Children and Families, “TANF caseload data: Combined TANF and SSP-MOE – 2023,” U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (2024), https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ofa/fy2023_tanssp_caseload.pdf.

91 Ibid.

92 Labor force participation and employment among unmarried mothers increased by 15 to 20 percent and the number of children in single-mother households who lived in poverty declined by 20 to 25 percent between 1995 and 2000. See, e.g., Census Bureau, “Current Population Survey: Annual social and economic supplement,” U.S. Department of Commerce (2024), https://data.census.gov/mdat.

93 Moving welfare enrollees into the labor force boosted economic growth in the late 1990s. See, e.g., Kenneth Hanson and Karen S. Hamrick, “Moving public assistance recipients into the labor force: 1996-2000,” U.S. Department of Agriculture (2004), https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/publications/46832/49356_fanrr40.pdf.

94 Nic Horton and Jonathan Ingram, “Work requirements are working for Kansas families: How welfare reform increases incomes and improves lives,” Foundation for Government Accountability (2017), https://thefga.org/research/kansas-work-requirements.

95 Ibid.

96 Ibid.

97 Ibid.

98 Jonathan Bain, “Work requirements work: How expanding food stamp work requirements can continue to break the cycle of dependency,” Foundation for Government Accountability (2023), https://thefga.org/research/work-requirements-work-break-cycle-dependency.

99 Jonathan Ingram and Nicholas Horton, “Commonsense welfare reform has transformed Floridians’ lives,” Foundation for Government Accountability (2019), https://thefga.org/research/commonsense-welfare-reform-has-transformed-floridians-lives.

100 Jonathan Ingram, “The power of work – How Kansas’ welfare reform is lifting Americans out of poverty,” Foundation for Government Accountability (2016), https://thefga.org/research/report-the-power-of-work-how-kansas-welfare-reform-is-lifting-americans-out-of-poverty.

101 Sam Adolphsen, “Testimony on program integrity for the food stamp program,” Foundation for Government Accountability (2018), https://thefga.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Testimony-on-program-integrity-for-the-food-stamp-program.pdf.

102 Jonathan Ingram and Nicholas Horton, “Welfare reform is moving Mississippians back to work,” Foundation for Government Accountability (2019), https://thefga.org/research/mississippi-food-stamps-work-requirement.

103 Jonathan Bain, “Work requirements work: How expanding food stamp work requirements can continue to break the cycle of dependency,” Foundation for Government Accountability (2023), https://thefga.org/research/work-requirements-work-break-cycle-dependency.

104 According to data provided by state Medicaid agencies, roughly 60 percent of able-bodied adults on Medicaid report no earnings. See, e.g., Jonathan Bain, “The X factor: How the labor force continues to be decimated by skyrocketing Medicaid enrollment,” Foundation for Government Accountability (2024), https://thefga.org/research/the-x-factor-labor-force-decimated-skyrocketing-medicaid-enrollment.

105 According to data from the U.S. Department of Agriculture, roughly 64 percent of able-bodied adults on food stamps do not work at all. See, e.g., Jonathan Bain, “Work requirements work: How expanding food stamp work requirements can continue to break the cycle of dependency,” Foundation for Government Accountability (2024), https://thefga.org/research/work-requirements-work-break-cycle-dependency.